Despite propaganda coup of F-15 crew rescue, downing is reminder to US that Iran can fight back
Donald Trump will claim rescue as a triumph but 48-hour drama should be a caution against launching ground operation
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Donald Trump will inevitably claim the rescue of the second crew member of the downed F-15 fighter as a propaganda triumph, though the 48-hour drama is a reminder that an undefeated Iran is able to fight back and inflict costs on the US.
It also ought to be a caution for a White House still contemplating whether to launch a ground operation in Iran to seize an island in the Persian Gulf – particularly if there a serious ambition to extract Iran’s highly enriched uranium from deep underground.
The US-Israeli bombing of Iran has been so heavily skewed in the attackers’ favour that a single shoot-down, five weeks into the war, immediately became a significant problem for the Americans because it is so rare – and memorable. The last time a US warplane was shot down by hostile forces was in 2003, during the Iraq war.
Though it is not exactly clear how the F-15E was brought down, the fact that it was is a reminder that the air superiority achieved by the US and Israeli air forces is not entirely absolute, even as they bomb Iran about 300 to 500 times a day.
An F-15E Strike Eagle has a cost of $31m (though a new replacement could be $100m) but it is the rescue, far more high-risk than whatever mission the US warplane was on, where the difficulties clearly began.
A decision to use an abandoned Iranian airstrip south of Isfahan as a forward operating location went wrong when two C-130 Hercules transporters, probably modified search and rescue variants, got stuck in the ground.
They were destroyed by the US to prevent them falling into the Iranians’ hands, US sources indicated, and more transporters had to be brought forward to complete the extraction of the wounded second crew member. Each of the modified Hercules have a list price of nearly $115m.
An HH-60 Pave Hawk helicopter involved in the rescue was also damaged by gunfire on Friday – so it is easy to conclude that the cost in lost and damaged airframes exceeds $250m, largely for the rescue of the second crew member.
In military terms, a single episode like this does not matter much to the US. Losing aircraft, whether shot down or in accidents, is part of war. The US had 218 F-15E Strike Eagles and 55 C-130s in its special force command before it attacked Iran, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
A full-scale US search and rescue operation was politically necessary to prevent Iran from capturing either member of the crew. The capture of one or both would have been a coup for Tehran, reviving memories of the US embassy hostage crisis of 1979-80, which did so much damage to the then president, Jimmy Carter.
The point was underlined by Trump, who emphasised in a social media post, using capitals, that the US would never leave an American warfighter behind. It is an attractive commitment, but one that means further cost and risk will be incurred each time it is called upon.
On this occasion Iranian forces failed to locate either of the F-15E crew. They were not able to contest the US’s use of the abandoned airbase south of Isfahan, though this could have been because of Reaper drones loitering overhead, which, according to US briefings, were there to kill any Iranian males getting within 3km.
But the enforced loss of the rescue C-130 transports is a reminder of the greater risks inherent in any US ground operation in Iran. Could it really be feasible for US special forces to seize the 440kg of highly enriched uranium thought to be hidden underground in canisters at Isfahan and fly them away without major incident?
There is no doubt that Iran – bombed in excess of 15,000 times so far – is being battered by the relentless US and Israeli airstrikes. But Tehran can still turn relatively small US or Israeli losses into a propaganda victory, whatever the state of its troops or air defences, precisely because they have been infrequent.
In an asymmetric conflict, the weaker side only has to get lucky once.

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